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IN RE AUGUR.*
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION.
This is an application to admit to probate what is claimed to be
a substantial copy of the will of Harriet M. Augur, the original will
not being produced in court, but evidence being offered to show
that such a will had been legally executed, but that it had been
either lost or fraudulently destroyed.
The only evidence offered by the contestant was a copy of a writ
and complaint, dated May 13, 1899, claiming an injunction, in an
action brought by the proponent and others in the Superior Court
against the contestant and others, admitted by the proponent to be
a true copy of the original. The allegations of this complaint were
*Decided in the Probate Court for the District of New Haven, Connecti-
cut, March 13, 1900.
This case is interesting for the reason that it deals with substantially a
new point of law, i. e., the legal effect of evidence showing that a lost will was
last known to have been in the possession of another than the testator.
Practically all the cases deal with the presumption of revocation arising where
a lost will was last known to have been in the possession of the testator. In
the very few cases where the lost will was out of the testator's possession, it is
generally clearly shown that the will was so entirely out of the testator's
possession that he could not destroy it animo revocandi, and remained so
until his death. In none of the cases does the court carefully consider the
question of the legal effect of proving that a lost will was last known to be in
the possession of another than the maker, and in none of them do the counsel
appear to discuss it. (See the cases cited in the body of the opinion.)
As might be inferred from the opinion the counsel for the proponent at
the trial of the case claimed that* the rule of law was as stated in larnian on
Wills I *133, Woerner's American Law of Administration I, *91, Greenleaf on
Evidence 11, §681 and Thornton on Lost Wills, §4
These authorities state the rule to be that: If a will once executed 2s not
found at its maker's death it is presumed revoked, "but that if the will is
traced out of the deceased's custody it is incumbent on the party asserting the
revocation to prove that the will came again into such custody or was destroyed
by his direction" (Jarman as cited).
On this point Jarman cites Colvin v. Fraser, 2 Hagg. Eccl. Reh. 327;
Wynn v'. Jievening am, z Coll. 638, 639. Greenleaf cites Jarman, ffinkler v.
Minkler, x4 Vt. 245; Helyar v.Helyar, x Lee 472; Lillie v. Lillie,3 Hagg. z84,
Lorley v. Jackson, 3 Phillim z26, and Jackson V. Betts, 9 Cowen 2a. Woerner
and Thornton apparently rely on the case of Dawson v. SmiA, 3 Hot.
(Del.) .. 3.
Jarman's citation of Colvin v. Fraser on this point would seem to be due
to a note to the case of Lillie v. Lillie in the 3rd of Haggard, which states the
law in this way and gives Colvin v. Praser as authority.
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based on information furnished by the proponent and were verified
by his oath.
The testatrix died August 28, 1898, leaving as her next of kin,
her son, Jacob Heitman Augur, who died in March, i899. Jacob
P. Augur, the husband of Harriet M. Augur, and the father of
Jacob Heitman Augur, died in 1879, leaving a will by which he gave
to this son, his only child, one hundred dollars, and all the residue
of his estate to his wife.
The proponent is a nephew of Jacob P. Augur, and a beneficiary
under the alleged lost will of Harriet M. Augur, and the contestant
is Marie E. Augur, widow-and legatee of Jacob Heitman Augur.
It appears from the evidence of ex-Judge Lucius P. Deming, a
practicing attorney, that in 1882 he was requested to draw a will
for Mrs. Augur. He produced in court a pencil memorandum,
In that case the will was known to have been for nine years before he died in
the testator's possession. In Wynn vs. Heveningham the will was found
mutilated, and having been proved at all times to have been in the hands of a
custodian, it was found by the court not the work of the testator. The other
cases cited by Jarman, Woerner, Greenleaf, and Thornton will all be found to
have been decided on another point except Dawson 'v. Smith. This, as indi-
cated in the opinion above, is merely a charge to a jury, and the judge says the
whole'matter is a question of fact. Thus it is seen that the exception to the
rule as stated has a very slender foundation in authority. Much apparently
has been inferred from the statement that the presumption of revocation arises
where the will has been "traced into the testator's fiossession." The opinion
shows that in its bald form it cannot be correct.
The main rule or presumption as stated in the opinion and by Chancellor
Walworth in the case of Betts v. Jackson, 6 Wend. z73 has its foundation in
experience which teaches that the absence of a will is presumptive evidence
of its revocation. This presumption, however, may be overcome by showing in
any of a variety of ways that it is improbable that the will was revoked. This
may be done by showing that the will was destroyed without the testator's
knowledge (Brown v. Brown, io Yerg. 84), by showing that the testator's cir-
cumstances did not change after the making of the will, and that he seemed
satisfied with the disposition he had made of his property. Legarre v. Ashe,
s Bay (S. C.) 464 ; McBeth v. McBeth, rr Ala. 596; Foster's Afjieal, 07 Pa.
St. 67; In re Page sS, Ill., 576; Sugden v. Lord St. Leonards L. R. Y P.
D.zS4; Southworth v.Adams Fed. Cas.Nro. 3,594; In re Steineke's Will,7o N.
W. 5 9 (Wis.); In re Lambie's Estate, 56 N. W. a2; Behrens v. Behrens, 47
Ohio St. 343; Collagan v. Burns, 57 M fe. 449; Scroggins v. Turner, 98 N. C.
s35;Eckersleyv. Pratt L.R., z P.D.28r;Minklerv.Minkler ut su5.; by show-
ing that it was out of the testator's possession and that he could not destroy it (see
cases cited in the opinion); and finally by -showing generally that the proba-
bility is that the will was not revoked (see cases above cited and Welch v.
Phillifis, z Moore P. C. 2W). In. effect the rule might be stated that the will
is presumed revokedunless satisfactorily accounted for, or unless it is shown in
some other way that the probability is it wasn't destroyed by the testator.
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made by him at Mrs. Augur's residence, at her dictation, the day be-
fore the execution of the will.
He testified with particularity as to the execution of the will,
and that the paper recently drawn by him, at the suggestion of the
attorneys for the proponent, was merely an amplification, in the
form usually employed in drawing wills, of the language more
tersely but less technically expressed in the memorandum itself.
He testified that the will, when executed, was placed in an en-
velope endorsed "Will of Harriet M. Augur;" that it was handed
by him to the testatrix, and by her to Mr. Willett Hemingway, one
of the witnesses to the will; that he has never seen it since, but that
he recently found this memorandum among his papers in unsuccess-
fully searching for a copy of the will, it being his custom to preserve
copies of wills drawn by him. The memorandum reads as follows:
The famous case of Sugden v. Lord St. Leonards ut suip. amounts to this.
See also the opinion in Southworth v. Adams ut sup.
The effect of the presumption is this: if there is no evidence to the con-
trary, the absence of the will establishes a prima facie case that it was
destroyed animo revocandi; if there is evidence to the contrary, then the pre-
sumption is a page from the experience of the judges to be borne in mind by
the trier in weighing the evidence (see Thayer, Evidence at the Common Law
pp. 336, 346).
If this is the true scope of the presumption the exception cannot be
correctly stated by these text-books. It would then be stronger than the rule.
If it is not true that in all cases, under all circumstances, the absence of the will
throws on the proponents the duty of showing the existence of the will at the
testator's death, or its destruction without his knowledge and consent before his
death, it cannot be true that merely to trace the will out of the testator's
possession is enough to throw on the contestants the duty of showing its
destruction by the testator or that it came again into his possession. In many
cases as in the present, the tracing of the will into the possession of another
might not raise any probability that the testator never got it again or that he
did not revoke it. The custodian might be in daily intercourse with the testa-
tor, and other facts might develop which on the proponents' own evidence
would so counteract the effects of the testimony as not to leave it weight
enough to rebut the main presumption.
Moreover, any rule as to the effect of such evidence would seem needless.
It needs no experience in dealing with wills to appreciate its weight. If a
testator couldn't get at his will, he couldn't destroy it. That is common sense.
Law on the subject is unnecessary.
The only case really out of harmony with the law as above stated is the
case of Sfrigge v. S:rigge L. R., z P. D. 6o8, where it is held that if the
maker of a will becomes insane before death, and at his death a will known
to have been made by him cannot be found, those contesting its probate must
show its destruction while he was sane. This would seem inconsistent with
the trend of the law and a broader statement than the case requires. It is
.easi to imagine cases in which its application would work hardship.-Eds.
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"Will Harriet M. Augur Willet Hemingway Executor Pay
all debts &c. Give Mary Augur Lane $iooo. in consideration
of services. Give Hattie Mariah Augur Hollister $Iooo. for
name. Give F. H. U. Cemetery $200. Give Jacob Hiteman
Augur, son, $io,ooo. In case his death give to Maria F. Augur,
his wife. If both dead to children, if any. All rest of estate
give & bequeath to brothers & sisters of husband Jacob
P. Augur, by both wives, if any dead give portion to children
of deceased if any Brothers & sisters & 3 brother and sisters
to share alike."
I find from the evidence that Harriet M. Augur did legally exe-
cute a will in 1882, and that the memorandum itself, rather than the
recently prepared so-called "copy," contains the substance of that
will. It is claimed that this will was in existence at the death of
Mrs. Augur, if not destroyed without her knowledge or consent be-
fore her death, and that it should now be established, proof of its
contents having been produced. The vital question is: Was the
will revoked by the testatrix before her death?
The mere absence of a will raises a presumption that it is re-
voked. In re Johnson's Will, 40 Conn. 587; Colvin v. Fraser, 2
Hagg. 266; Betts v. Jackson, 6 Wendell 173; Newell v. Homer, 120
Mass. 277; Rice's American Probate Law 248.
This presumption, however, is a presumption of fact rebuttable
by evidence. But it is claimed that the presumption of destruction
animo revocandi does not arise in this case because it is claimed
that the deceased did not have ready access to her will, since by the
evidence that the will was handed by her to Willett Hemingway
immediately after it was executed, it has been "traced out of her
possession."
While many cases are authority for the proposition that a will
once executed, but not found at death, is presumed to have been re-
voked, if the testator had ready access to it, there are few decisions
to support the bare proposition that no such presumption arises
where the will was simply not in the possession of the testator.
Thornton in his work on Lost Wills, Sec. 64, prefers to state
the law as follows: "It is the prevailing rule that if the will is not
forthcoming at the death of the testator its revocation will be pre-
sumed, whether it was in his personal possession or in the posses-
sion of another; but in the latter instance the presumption is
quite a weak one."
The early English cases referred to in some of the text books,
as authority for the proposition that the burden of proof shifts to the
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contestants to show revocation where the will is "shown out of the
possession of the testator" or "traced out of the testator's posses-
sion," are at best but dicta. The American authority apparently re-
lied on being Dawson v. Smith, 3 Houston (Del.) 335, which is not
the opinion of a court of last resort, but merely the charge of a judge
to a jury in a lower court.
This statement of the rule that the burden of proof shifts cannot
be correct if the expressions "shown out of the possession of the
testator" or "traced out of the testator's possession" are used
merely in the sense of not being in his manual possession. It be-
comes important, therefore, to inquire what is meant by thus "trac-
ing the will out of his possession." In the absence of direct author-
ity on this point we must resort to the reason for the rule to guide
in its construction. The ordinary presumption of the continued
existence of that once found to exist, could not with safety be ap-
plied to the case of a will not found upon the death of the maker
of it.
It is ordinary experience that wills, the legal execution of which
necessarily involves more or less publicity, are frequently destroyed
in secret, and but for the presumption of revocation which the law
wisely raises, wills, in fact revoked, would often be admitted to pro-
bate, the intention of the maker being thwarted because of the com-
parative ease of proving that a will once existed and the corre-
sponding difficulty of showing its secret revocation.
There can be no good reason why the same presumption should
not arise even when the will is shown not to have been in the pos-
session of the testator, provided he could have had access to it at
any time. But if it be shown that the will was so deposited in the
custody of another that the testator could not have had an oppor-
tunity to destroy it without the knowledge of the custodian, and if
it appears that, so far as he knows, the testator did not secure access
to his will before his death, there is every reason, in such a case,
why this presumption of revocation should not arise, and why the
burden of proof should be on the contestant to show that the will
was revoked by the testator.
In most of the cases where it is held on this ground that the pre-
sumption of revocation is overcome, it appeared from the evidence,
generally from the testimony of the custodian of the will, that the
testator had not, and could not have had, access to it. Hildreth v.
Schillinger, 2 Stockton (N. J.) 196; Tynan v. Paschal, 27 Texas
286 (84 American Decisions 619); Schultz v. Schultz, 35 N. Y. 653,
655; In re Page, i i8 Illinois 576.
YALE LAW JOURNAL.
Not only has no proof been offered to show that Mrs. Augur did
not at all times have ready access to her will, but having, as she did,
intimate business relations with Mr. Willett Hemingway, the exec-
utor of her husband's will, it cannot, in the absence of any evidence
to that effect, be presumed that she did not have access to her will
during Mr. Hemingway's life, and if it was still in his custody at the
time of his death, which occurred several years before her own, that
she did not then take it into her own possession. Even the pro-
ponent himself must have assumed that she did take it into her pos-
session, for it does not appear from the evidence that he thought
that there was any occasion, before attempting to probate the will as
a lost will, to seek out Willett Hemingway's personal representa-
tives and through them to search for it among Willett Hemingway's
papers.
Unless this view is taken, the evidence introduced by the pro-
ponent to show that all the papers of Mrs. Augur were kept in her
safe deposit box in the Second National Bank, to which box they
claimed that Jacob Heitman Augur had access, and their intimation
that the will was in that box until destroyed, as they suggest by him,
is meaningless. Moreover, in the fifteenth paragraph of the sworn
complaint in the injunction case, before referred to, it is alleged by
the proponent himself that the last will and testament of Harriet M.
Augur was in her possession prior to her decease.
As far as appears, then, Mrs. Augur had "ready access," within
the meaning of the law, to her will while it was in the possession of
Willett Hemingway, and thereafter it is not traced out of her pos-
session and control, whether she kept it in her own house or in her
safe deposit box in the Second National Bank, and, therefore, in
accordance with the authorities cited, the mere absence of the will at
her death raises a presumption of its revocation. But the pro-
ponent claims that even if the presumption of revocation arises, it is
a rebuttable one, and that it has in this case been rebutted by evi-
dence.
Has, then, this presumption been thus rebutted? The proponent
has offered evidence to show alienation of affection between the son
and mother, abusive treatment of the mother by the son and ex-
pressions by her to others of displeasure' with his conduct. They
claim to have shown sufficient occasion for the will being drawn as
it was, good reason for not changing it, and disposition and oppor-
tunity on the part of the son to destroy it. But neither disposition
nor opportunity is enough to show that he did destroy it, however
interested he might have been to do so, nor is the presumption of
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revocation thereby overcome. Collyer v. Collyer, iio N. Y. 481:
Knapp v. Knapp, io N. Y. 276; In re Kennedy's will, New York
Law Journal, December 23, 1899, page 989. Moreover, fraud, es-
pecially fraud involving-crime, is never to be presumed. Besides if,
as proponent has sworn in the injunction suit, he had already ob-
tained from her transfers in his favor of all her real and personal
estate, the very making of these transfers is an additional reason for
supposing that the will was destroyed by the testatrix animo
revocandi.
But it is urged that the declarations of the testatrix, during the
last few years of her life, in regard to the disposition of her property,
show that she treated her will as in force and unrevoked by her.
Witnesses testified, for example, to such statements by her as that
she had made her will and had remembered them, and that she had
carried out her husband's wishes in regard to her estate; but With the
exception of Mary Augur Lane, whose testimony does not relate
to declarations of the deceased later than 1896, there is no witness
whose testimony necessarily connects such declarations with the
particular will executed in 1882, and unless the proponent relies on
the will of Jacob P. Augur, as an expression of his wishes, there is
no testimony to show what his Wishes were. Certainly it is diffi-
cult to understand how in giving her son ten thousand dollars by
her will, Mrs. Augur was carrying out the Wishes of her husband,
who, by his will, gave him only one hundred dollars. This of itself
is enough to indicate that even if Harriet M. Augur was sincere in
her declarations, made chiefly to the 'beneficiaries of the will sought
to le established, she may not have been referring at all to the will
executed in 1882. But even if she did refer to this will made in
1882, as late as June, 1898, she had ample time to revoke it before
her death in August, 1898. As Surrogate Varnum said In re
Kennedy, supra, "The mere fact of the execution of a will six or
eight weeks before the death of the decedent will not affect the pre-
sumption that it was destroyed by him with the intent to revoke it.
In many of the cases the interval which elapsed between the date
when the will was last seen, or known to be in existence, and the
date of the death of the decedent, was much shorter and in some
cases only a few days."
In the opinion of this Court the presumption of revocation has
not been overcome by the evidence. In other words the proponent
has not satisfied the Court, by the testimony offered, that Harriet M.
Augur's will, executed in 1882, was-in existence at her death, or that
it. was destroyed without her knowledege or consent before her
death.
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It is well settled, as claimed in argument by counsel for the con-
testant, that no evidence of the contents of a lost will should be in-
troduced until after evidence of an exhaustive preliminary search
has been offered. This Court is far from being satisfied that such a
search was made in this case, yet as no objection was made on that
ground when the evidence as to the contents was introduced, I
should not deny the application on that ground, without first giv-
ing the applicant an opportunity to introduce further evidence on
that point, or to complete the search if it was still incomplete, but it
is unnecessary to reopen the whole case for the purpose of receiving
evidence on this preliminary question, in view of the conclusions
arrived at by the Court on more decisive grounds. The application
is denied.
LivINGSTON W. CLEAVELA.ND, Judge.
